Many of you have expressed an interest in moral and cultural relativism. Thank you for interest in this subject; I think it's a rewarding debate. This post is designed to explain some of the basic issues of moral relativism and provide you with some resources for further reading, if you desire.
Before I begin, I'd like to point you to some resources that may be helpful as you seek clarification for your ideas. I would begin researching the issue by reading the entry on Moral Relativism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (hereafter SEP). This text relies on this entry. As you may know, the SEP is a very useful guide for understanding common philosophical terms, and is written by prominent philosophers in their respective fields. Here is a link to the SEP: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. For in-depth discussions of contemporary research in moral relativism and medical ethics, Professor Barash recommends works by Macklin ("Against relativism: Cultural diversity and the search for universals in medicine" is one she particularly mentioned).
There are, broadly speaking, two different versions of moral relativism. The first is Empirical Moral Relativism, which states that there are many, intractable, empirical differences between moral systems across societies. The second is Metaethical Moral Relativism, which argues that the truth and/or justification for different moral systems are relative to a particular culture, society, or time period. Both versions are hotly debated.
Empirical Moral Relativism seeks to establish both that there are widespread disagreements across cultures, and that these differences are unresolvable. Defenders of this position point to a number of anthropological, sociological, historical, and psychological studies documenting differences in moral systems across cultures. Opponent of this position argue in several different ways against this position. One strategy is to argue that the position is not established or true on a priori grounds. That is, they say that the position cannot be supported because any moral conflict is resolved by abstracting from the principle to general rules which are shared across cultures. Another strategy is to argue on a posteriori grounds that the position cannot be supported. Such arguments might take the form of disputing the data cited by defenders of the position, or by pointing to data that demonstrates sufficiently significant moral agreements across cultures. For example, Beauchamp argues in this vein by claiming that there are 10 universal moral principles. His claim is descriptive -- he is claiming that there are 10 universal moral principles, not that there should be universal moral principles. It might also be argued that individual cultures are not disparate units, but instead flow into each other, creating a blurred division between where one culture starts and another ends; such non-simplistic categories create problems for Empirical Moral Relativists because they are arguing that moral principles are relative to a particular, and definitive, culture.
Empirical Moral Relativism is often used as a premise in arguing for Metaethical Moral Relativism. Defenders of Metaethical Moral Relativism must argue both against moral skeptics and against moral objectivists, meaning that they must establish both that we can know universal moral principles AND that there are no universal moral principles. It's a difficult case to make. To begin with, Metaethical Moral Relativists must avoid self-refuting arguments. They cannot, for example, argue that we must be tolerant, since universal toleration of other moral systems would be a universal moral truth. More importantly, Metaethical Moral Relativists must defend the idea of relative justification for a moral truth, that is, that X is true relative to S. Relative justification is a complex epistemological issue. Opponents of Metaethical Moral Relativism might argue that if moral truths are relative to a particular population, then there could be said to be no moral conflict (each society is morally justified, and maybe even obligated, to disparage divergent moral practices); yet, why was there a presumption of conflict at all? This argument is a variation of Donaldson's argument that relativism presupposes an objective morality.
In addition, Metaethical Moral Relativism cannot account for common sense intuitions of condemnation for horrific practices (i.e. the Holocaust). While defenders of Metaethical Moral Relativism might recognize this as a benefit to the theory, or at least accept it as a logical casualty of the theory, this seemingly obvious condemnation expresses two arguments about moral objectivism. The first deals with issues of burden of proof; common sense intuitions like this might highlight that we have more (universal) justification for believing in objective moral standards than we do in relative ones (either justifications or standards), requiring a higher standard of evidence of Metaethical Moral Relativists. The other argument is that a defender of Metaethical Moral Relativism needs an account of relative truths. To say that X is true relative to S must "mean more than that the people in S accept X" (SEP). (This is a particularly important idea for Metaethical Moral Relativists who argue for individual moral relativism, and not cultural moral relativism.) We accept the idea that epistemological truths can be revised, and that epistemologists are subject to error in formulating and justifying truths. Yet, how can a Metaethical Moral Relativist account for why and how some truths can function as authoritative for a particular culture, given that epistemological truths are subject to error and discovery? In other words, what is morally true relative to S is what is prescribed by some set of authoritative standards, some of which might be unknown or misunderstood to a population at a given time. It is not immediately clear why and how there could be a set of authoritative standards on a such a relative account. The SEP illustrates how this might be a problem by pointing the to idea of dissent: if an individual in S disagrees with a moral standard in S, how can such a disagreement be resolved? In cases such as this, some relativists have turned to arguments for complete individual moral relativism (Foucault argues for this in his work -- though in his later years he accepts a version of the Golden Rule as an objective moral standard). I am not sure, however, if this actually solves the problem or if it just pushes the level of analysis farther back.
Another avenue defenders of Metaethical Moral Relativism might pursue is to argue that moral premises are simply expressions of subjective opinions of either preference or emotion. This is an interesting idea, but before it can do any work in an extended argument about morality, it needs to be argued for as a premise. A sound argument cannot be constructed from this premise by assuming it as an axiom. Without such an argument, the argument for either type of moral relativism is weakened. There are several traditions that might be of use in arguing for this position because they espouse similar ideas. The idea that moral premises are expressions of preference is also often attributed to simple subjectivists. In simple subjectivism, moral statements are regarded as mere expressions of an individual's likes/dislikes. Also, Hume and Adam Smith discuss morality as expressions of emotion. One might turn to their work for information on this strand of argumentation.
As is the case with all issues about which people feel passionately, please be wary of the Appeal to Belief fallacy (it is described in the Jecker article). Truth must be justified on the basis of facts, and not from belief. It is not sound to use your belief in something as a premise for a conclusion about the truth of (or the existence of), say, a moral principle. Truth can be derived from facts, but it would be a fallacious move to deduce truth from beliefs. The content of belief premises are not true, nor are they false; they ascribe a belief to a person, but do not justify the truth of the belief.
I hope this information has been helpful. Please contact me (jjwmcd@bu.edu) with any questions.
(Submitted by Josh McDonald)
